Massively multiple online role playing games as normative multiagent systems by Magnus, Johansson & Verhagen, Harko
  
Massively multiple online role playing games as 
normative multiagent systems 
Magnus Johansson and Harko Verhagen 
K2lab, Dept. of Computer and Systems Sciences,  
Stockholm University/KTH, Forum 100, 16440 Kista, Sweden 
{magnus, verhagen}@dsv.su.se 
Abstract. The latest advancements in computer games offer a 
domain of human and artificial agent behaviour well suited for 
analysis and development based on normative multi agent systems 
research.  One of the most influential gaming trends today, 
Massively Multi Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG), poses 
new questions about the interaction between the players in the 
game. If we model the players and groups of players in these 
games as multiagent systems with the possibility to create norms 
and sanction norm violations we have to create a way to describe 
the different kind of norms that may appear in these situations.  
Certain situations in MMORPG are subject to discussions about 
how norms are created and propagated in a group, one such 
example involves the sleeper in the game Everquest, from Sony 
Online Entertainment (SOE). The Sleeper was at first designed to 
be unkillable, but after some events and some considerations from 
SOE the sleeper was finally killed. The most interesting aspect of 
the story about the sleeper is how we can interpret the norms being 
created in this example. We propose a framework to analyse the 
norms involved in the interaction between players and groups in 
MMORPG. We argue that our model adds complexity where we 
find earlier norm typologies lacking some descriptive power of this 
phenomenon, and we can even describe and understand the 
confusing event with the sleeper in Everquest.  
Introduction  
The games of today, both computer games and console games, are starting 
to focus on the opportunities that online co-operation can provide for the 
gaming experience. Games such as World of Warcraft (WoW) can have as 
many as thousands of active players in one of their gaming servers at the 
same time. Much of the “Massively multiple online role playing games” 
(MMORPG) genre seems to be all about co-operation and playing together 
and this in turn makes MMORPG:s an interesting phenomenon to 
investigate. In WoW there are many opportunities to engage in different 
social formations of different sizes, but one of the most common is to join 
a guild. A guild is a group of players that decide to play together for a 
period of time exceeding the length of one playing session. It is also 
possible to form smaller groups with short term goals. 
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 09121 
Normative Multi-Agent Systems 
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1895
2      Magnus Johansson and Harko Verhagen 
 
                                                          
After exploring the game world of WoW it is obvious that these games 
have rules, codes of conduct, do:s and don’t:s that are either explicit or 
implicit. We may even want to call them norms, and these norms seem to 
be part of the very fabric of the interaction in this game genre. It is 
important to get an understanding for the differences between where a 
designer actually could influence the norms and where the norms are 
beyond the control of the designer and perhaps constantly evolving. If we 
take a close look at different aspects of most MMORPG:s it will be 
apparent that some parts of the game will live a life of its own, where local 
norms will appear through the interaction between players. 
In “Ten Challenges for Normative Multiagent Systems” (Boella et al, 
2008b), one of the examples comes from game playing, describing a team 
effort in Everquest to kill “The Sleeper”, which was initially designed to 
be unkillable. This example is also used as the running example in (Boella 
et al. 2008a). Being interested in the design of games and following 
discussions online, it seems as though the killer actually was vulnerable to 
the attacks of the group due to a miss when updating one of the zones in 
Everquest, therefore a series of events led the sleeper to be killed by the 
group after some consideration from Sony, since one group came really 
close when the sleeper suddenly disappeared (this is thought to be the 
result of a Sony employee, resetting the instance when the impossible was 
about to happen). All other scenarios than this would indicate that the 
game designer would have made a big mistake in the initial efforts of 
designing the Sleeper. For more details we include the email send by 
Sony1 and an explanation offered on Wikipedia2 both focussing on a 
software glitch as the cause for the first Sleeper killing. 
1  “The Sleeper (11-17-03) 
Over the weekend several guilds gathered on Rallos to fight with the Sleeper.  
Unfortunately, their encounter was cut short due to an apparent bug. I wanted to 
take a moment here and apologize to those that were there, and to those that 
have heard about the event through their friends.  The bug concerned an NPC in 
the zone that appeared to have been causing the Sleeper to not focus on the 
player characters.  The decision was made at the time to end the event.  Further 
investigation has only served to make it unclear if this was a real issue or not. 
I, on behalf of the company, apologize for any consternation this may have caused 
during your play time.  If anyone is going to defeat the Sleeper, it should be 
done without any question about the validity of the event.  We're very sorry that 
this first attempt was halted, but at the time it seemed like the best thing to do. 
We have resurrected and restored those that participated. We have corrected the 
potential problem, and have reset the encounter.  Other than that one potentially 
problematic NPC, nothing else about the encounter has been changed. 
We want to wish those on Rallos that are planning to tackle the Sleeper the best of 
luck. 
Send me some screenshots of all of you standing around the corpse, I'd love to post 
them on the site. 
Thank you and thanks for understanding, 
 
Alan” (EverQuest Chat) 
 
2 “Kerafyrm, "The Sleeper", is a dragon boss in the original "The Sleeper's 
Tomb" zone. 
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In this article we will introduce the view on norms as it has developed 
in the social sciences, mainly sociology. Then we will propose an 
extension to the normative framework developed by Gibbs (1965) and 
apply this framework to situations in WoW. Finally we will describe some 
related research before we finish with conclusions and proposals for future 
research. 
Normative multiagent systems and the definition of norms 
in the social sciences 
At the 2007 NorMAS Dagstuhl workshop the definition of a normative 
multiagent system was the concluding part of the whole week, together 
with a list of future research questions. In the introduction to the following 
JAAMAS special issue (Boella et al. 2008b) the definition  voted for by 
the majority of participants is presented as: 
“A normative multiagent system is a multiagent 
system organised by means of mechanisms to 
represent, communicate, distribute, detect, 
create, modify, and enforce norms, and 
mechanisms to deliberate about norms and detect 
norm violation and fulfilment.” 
Note that the definition does not define the nature of the agents (i.e., they 
can be artificial or human) nor about the boundaries of a normative system 
(even if it gives the impression of a well-defined system). 
Within the social sciences and more particularly in sociology and social 
philosophy norms are discussed and defined in different ways. We present 
 
While sleeping, Kerafyrm is guarded by four ancient dragons (warders) in 
"The Sleeper's Tomb". When all four dragons are defeated by players and 
are dead at the same time, The Sleeper awakes, triggering a rampage of 
death. Kerafyrm travels through and into multiple zones from The 
Sleeper's Tomb to Skyshrine, killing every player and NPC in his path. 
This event is unique in EverQuest, because it can only occur once on each 
game server. Once The Sleeper awakes, neither he nor the original 
guardians will ever appear again on that server, unless the event is reset by 
SOE. 
As of 12 July 2008, Kerafyrm remains asleep only on the Al'Kabor 
(Macintosh) server. 
Originally intended to be unkillable, SOE prevented a raid of several 
guilds on Rallos Zek server from potentially killing him because of a 
potential bug. SOE later apologized for interfering,[25] and allowed the 
players to retry the encounter. 
"Kerafyrm The Awakened" appears in the expansion Secrets of Faydwer as 
part of a raid event "Crystallos, Lair of the Awakened" in the instanced 
zone of "Crystallos." ” (Wikipedia) 
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some of the definitions common on the social sciences and conclude with 
the framework we will use. 
In Gibbs (1965) a typology of norms concerning the regulation of 
behaviour and acts is described encompassing conventions, morals, mores, 
rules and laws as depicted in table 1. These various social mechanisms are 
structured using the following dichotomies: 
• Probability that a sanction will be issued (yes – no) 
• Characteristics of the agent issuing a sanction (special status or no 
special status) 
• Evaluation of an act (collective or not) 
• Expectation concerning the act (collective or not) 
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  High probability of a possible sanction when the act occurs 
  By anyone (i.e., without regard to status) Only by a person or persons in a particular status or 
statuses 
evaluation of 
the act 
expectation 
concerning 
the act 
Low probability of 
a possible sanction 
when the act 
occurs 
By means that exclude 
the use of force 
By means that may 
include the use of 
force 
By means that exclude 
the use of force 
By means that may 
include the use of force 
Collective 
expectation 
Type A: 
Collective 
conventions 
Type D: 
Collective morals 
Type H: 
Collective mores 
Type L: 
Collective rules 
Type P: 
Collective laws 
Collective 
evaluation  
No 
collective 
expectation  
Type B. 
Problematic 
conventions 
Type E: 
Problematic morals 
Type I: 
Problematic mores 
Type M: 
Problematic rules 
Type Q: 
Problematic laws 
Collective 
expectation  
Type C: 
Customs 
Type F: 
empty class 
Type J: 
empty class 
Type N: 
Exogenous rules 
Type R: 
Exogenous laws 
No collective 
evaluation  
No 
collective 
expectation  
Logical null class, 
i.e., non-normative
Type G: 
empty class 
Type K: 
empty class 
Type O: 
Coercive rules 
Type S: 
Coercive laws 
 
Table 1. Gibbs’  Norm typology (1965)
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Tuomela (1995) on his turn distinguished two kinds of social norms 
(meaning community norms), namely, rules (r-norms) and proper social 
norms (s-norms). Rules are norms created by an authority structure and 
always based on agreement making. Proper social norms are based on 
mutual belief. Rules can be formal, in which case they are connected to 
formal sanctions, or informal, where the sanctions are also informal. 
Proper social norms consist of conventions, which apply to a large 
group such as a whole society or socioeconomic class, and group-specific 
norms. The sanctions connected to both types of proper social norms are 
social sanctions and may include punishment by others and expelling from 
the group. Aside from these norms, Tuomela also described personal 
norms and potential social norms3 containing, among others, moral and 
prudential norms (m-norms and p-norms, respectively). The reasons for 
accepting norms differ as to the kind of norms: 
• Rules are obeyed because they are agreed upon. 
• Proper social norms are obeyed because others expect one to obey. 
• Moral norms are obeyed because of one’s conscience. 
• Prudential norms are obeyed because it is the rational thing to do. 
The motivational power of all types of norms depends on the norm being a 
subject’s reason for action. In other words, norms need to be internalized 
and accepted.  
Therborn (2002) distinguishes three kinds of norms. Constitutive norms 
define a system of action and an agent's membership in it; regulative 
norms describe the expected contributions to the social system, and 
distributive norms defining how rewards, costs, and risks are allocated 
within a social system. Furthermore, he distinguishes between non-
institutionalized normative order, made up by personal and moral norms in 
day-to-day social traffic, and institutions, an example of a social system 
defined as a closed system of norms. Institutional normative action is 
equalled with role plays, i.e., roles find their expressions in expectations, 
obligations, and rights vis-à-vis the role holder's behaviour. 
In Elster (2007) a whole range of social mechanisms are described. 
Among them is the concept of social norms. A social norm is defined as an 
injunction to act or abstain from acting. The working mechanism is the use 
of informal sanctions aimed at norm violators. Sanctions may affect the 
material situation of the violator via direct punishment or social ostracism. 
An open question is the costs of sanctioning. Apart from social norms 
Elster describes moral norms (that are unconditional) and quasi-moral 
norms (like social norms these are conditional but triggered by being able 
to observe what others are doing instead of by being observed by other 
people as is the case for social norms). Other connected concepts are legal 
norms (where special agents enforce the norms) and conventions that are 
independent of external agent action. In his text, Elster discusses in detail 
some examples of norms such as: norms about etiquette, norms as codes of 
honour, and norms about the use of money. 
3 Potential social norms are norms that are normally widely obeyed but not in their 
essence based on social responsiveness and that, in principle, could be personal 
only. 
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Combining these frameworks results in the following: Therborns 
regulative norms encompass all of Gibbs categories whereas Therborns 
constitutive and distributive norms are outside of Gibbs’ scope. Tuomela’s 
r-norms encompass Gibbs type L, M, P and Q and his s-norms type D, E, 
H and I respectively. The moral norms Tuomela mentions are outside of 
Gibbs scope as these are norms where an agent is its own evaluator. 
Prudential norms are incommensurable with Gibbs typology or indeed any 
other typology. Elsters moral norms are equivalent to Tuomela’s moral 
norms whereas his quasi-moral norms seem to fit to Gibbs type O and S. 
Elster’s conventions map to Gibbs type A and the legal norms to type P or 
Q. This is presented in table 2 below. 
In the remainder of this paper we will use the following notion of norms: 
“Norms are statements about the appropriateness 
of an agent’s act which may result in a sanction 
being issued by another agent or an agent 
belonging to a specific class of agents.” 
    Magnus Johansson and Harko Verhagen 
 
  High probability of a possible sanction when the act occurs 
  By anyone (i.e., without regard to status) Only by a person or persons in a particular status or 
statuses 
evaluation of 
the act 
expectation 
concerning 
the act 
Low probability of 
a possible sanction 
when the act 
occurs 
By means that exclude 
the use of force 
By means that may 
include the use of 
force 
By means that exclude 
the use of force 
By means that may 
include the use of force 
Collective 
expectation 
Elster  
conventions 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
Tuomela 
r-norms 
Tuomela r-norms/ 
Elster legal norms 
Collective 
evaluation  
No 
collective 
expectation  
Type B. 
Problematic 
conventions 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
Tuomela 
r-norms 
Tuomela r-norms/ 
Elster legal norms 
Collective 
expectation  
Type C: 
Customs 
Type F: 
empty class 
Type J: 
empty class 
Type N: 
Exogenous rules 
Type R: 
Exogenous laws 
No collective 
evaluation  
No 
collective 
expectation  
Logical null 
class, i.e., non-
normative 
Type G: 
empty class 
Type K: 
empty class 
Elster  
quasi-moral norms 
Elster  
quasi-moral norms 
Table 2. Adapted version of Gibbs’ norm typology (equivalent to Therborns regulative norms) encompassing Elsters and 
Tuomelas norm typologies.
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Norms in MMORPG 
We propose to use the revised framework presented above to understand 
the dynamics of the most common norms and norm violations in 
MMORPG:s. 
In MMORPG:s severe violations are usually punished by ostracisation 
of the norm violators or the loss of points in a value system where a player 
can earn points for assisting the guild in raids (measured in DKP, short for 
Dragon Killing Points). It may be difficult to differentiate between what 
social behaviour is acceptable and what is not.  
Some players exhibit behaviour that violates norms in ways that could 
be described as cheating or grief play. Some of these examples are so 
common that most guilds have structured their rules to cover these issues 
as well. Smith (2004) mentions three different categories of behaviours 
that might infringe on the gaming experience of others. The three 
categories are cheating, local norm violation and grief play.   
 Cheating 
“Cheating” is the use of any technique that runs against the spirit of the 
game without being technically unfair (in the sense that it is violating a 
norm). It is however difficult to prove whether or not someone is cheating. 
The risk of sanctions being made against a violator depends on the 
severity of the violation. If the violation is very severe there usually is a 
“High probability that an attempt will be made to apply a sanction when 
the act occurs” (from Gibbs typology (1965) corresponding to Tuomela s-
norms).  
Local norm violation 
 “Local norm violation” is any violation of a mutual understanding of how 
the game ought to be played. These actions have different level of 
implications for other players and the players are usually sanctioned if the 
violation appears repeatedly. These violations have a “High probability 
that an attempt will be made to apply a sanction when the act occurs” from 
Gibbs typology (1965) but we have to keep in mind that minor violations 
might be ignored. These actions could potentially be sanctioned by anyone 
in the group, but the most probable solution in the case of a raid group 
would be that the raid leader would solve the problem without the use of 
force. The severest forms of violations may be punished with ostracism.   
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 Grief play 
 “Grief play” is a broad category of behaviour which causes a severe and 
stressful disadvantage to the target. Examples of grief play are; 
unprovoked harassment through game chat channels, repeatedly killing a 
player as soon as the character comes back to life, and behaviour not 
related to the winning condition of the game. Grief play in its different 
forms is behaviour that infringes the higher level norms of the realm and 
can be difficult to sanction. The penalty for someone engaging in this kind 
of activity should perhaps be ostracisation, but since the players are from 
different factions, it is difficult to make any sanctions from the victim’s 
side. Grief play would therefore fit the description of “Low probability 
that an attempt will be made to apply a sanction when the act occurs” from 
Gibbs typology (1965). 
All examples above are examples of social norms, since norm 
violations are punished with sanctions and are thus in accordance with 
e.g., Elster and our definition of norms. In the case of the last example this 
can be hard to prove however. The typology taken from Gibbs gives a 
better understanding at least when it comes to the probability of a sanction 
to occur, but it is very difficult to judge from case to case, since all these 
violations have different severity and impact on other players. Thus it 
seems that Gibbs framework and consequently also our revised framework 
may need to be extended to produce a more fine grained categorisation. 
Norms regulating the use of money 
Not surprisingly, money and valuable equipment may lead to conflicts in 
MMORPG:s. There are multiple ways of breaching norms for how to 
distribute money and equipment between all members of a guild. Some of 
the most common examples where discussions about money occur are the 
following situations; begging, ninja looting, and twinking. 
Begging 
Begging is usually other gamers in game asking for money, and this can in 
fact be disturbing behaviour that many guilds have strict rules against. 
Most beggars are being ostracised or ignored, since it is hard to make 
other sanctions against them. Beggars will eventually earn a bad reputation 
since gamers will gossip about this unwanted behaviour. It may be argued 
that this is addressed by Thernborns distributive norms. 
Ninja looting 
Ninja looting is another form of misconduct that most guilds have rules 
against. When a gamer steals the loot from another gamer under certain 
conditions when playing as a group this is defined as ninja looting. 
Massively multiple online role playing games as normative multiagent 
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Both begging and ninja looting have a “High probability that an attempt 
will be made to apply a sanction when the act occurs”, ostracism is the 
most probable action taken, but other actions may occur. The probability 
of sanctions including force is not very probable. Ninja looting can also be 
seen as a breach against Therborns distributive norms thus placing it 
outside the set of regulative norms. 
Twinking 
Twinking is when a high level gamer decides to help a low level character 
with money to buy better equipment or helping the low level gamer killing 
creatures above his/her skill level.  
The last example is actually not a serious norm violation and most 
gamers do not care about it and thus it would fit in the first category of 
Gibbs’ typology (1965) where no sanction would appear. It would also fit 
in under Therborns distributive norms. 
Norms regulating the use of tools 
Most MMORPG:s today are highly complex and sometimes a player can 
find that it is hard to keep track of the situation in game. Most games with 
a certain degree of complexity will eventually be subject to “add-ons”, 
where someone develops tools to highlight information in the game or 
perhaps give certain advantages for a player with the add-on installed.  
Add-ons range from small “cheating” applications in games such as 
“Counter strike” where “auto aiming” and the possibility to see through 
walls were used by some players. In WoW the most common add-ons are 
used for co-ordinating raid groups and displaying statistics for all 
characters in an instance (both players and Mob). This gives all players in 
the group an advantage that is not considered unfair, since most players 
use this kind of tools. But what is interesting is where to draw the line of 
what is considered enhancing the game and what is considered cheating. 
Norms are usually subject to constant change and there are interesting 
stories where new forms of norms are being created.  
T L Taylor (2006) describes the use of a tool called CTRaidAssist 
during a raid. This tool monitors many statistics of the characters of a raid 
group and in this example someone in the group came a bit to close to a 
mob (a non-player character or NPC) and therefore the entire group was 
being attacked by the mob and nearly killed. The raid leader (using 
CTRaidAssist) could see that the amount of aggression (a measurement of 
how close or threatening a character is to a mob) had increased, which had 
triggered the attack. The interesting part about this story is that the raid 
leader told everyone in the raid group that if someone would do the same 
thing again, this would result in penalties. This shows that tools can be 
used to monitor the players’ behaviour and thus enable the possibility of 
sanction behaviour that previously could not be sanctioned. This involves 
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a move from one category in Gibbs framework to another. Without the 
tool there is no or a very low probability of a sanction since the action 
cannot be detected. The tool enables a special person (in this case the raid 
leader) to issue a sanction. The message send by the leader leads to a 
collective expectation that players will refrain from this action and it is 
only the leader that can evaluate so there is no collective evaluation. So, 
introducing the tool moves the raid group from the logical null-class (non-
normative situation) in Gibbs’ typology to the situation labelled as 
“exogenous rules” (type N) even if the rules and sanctioning agent are 
mutually agreed upon in and part of the group. 
Different levels of organisation where norms appear in 
MMORPG:S 
WoW can be described at different organisational levels and as different 
types of norm systems, ranging from a high level perspective (the different 
types of servers, usually called realms in the game) down to the lowest 
level focusing on players and small groups. What seem to be characteristic 
about the higher levels such as the different gaming realms and factions is 
that the norms are of a wider scope, and communicate the spirit of the 
game without much attention to detail.  On the middle level (Guilds) there 
seems to be a stricter way of communicating, creating, and changing 
norms. It is apparent that a large group needs some form of organisation to 
work properly. On the lowest level (groups) there seems to be a mutual 
respect for the group and the norms are close to what could be considered 
common sense. The difference between the highest level and all levels 
below is that sanctions are more easily distributed on the lower levels, 
perhaps because they are agreed upon within a group with a finite number 
of players in a way similar to the proper social norms discussed by 
Tuomela (1995). 
Game servers 
The different types of game servers give rise to different sets of norms for 
the type of interaction that takes place on the server. Three different kinds 
of servers will be mentioned here, since they are the most common:  
1. Normal servers (No special rules applied),  
2. PvP servers (Player versus Player), and  
3. RP servers (Role Playing Servers).  
There are combinations of these types of servers, but they will not be 
discussed here since these combinations do not interfere with our analysis 
of the basic types. 
For our purpose the most interesting types of servers are the fairly 
restricted RP servers where all players are to stay in character when 
playing. This means that the player has to play along and make decisions 
according to what would be most likely for the character in the game. For 
instance, discussing game functionality or other meta-gaming issues is not 
Massively multiple online role playing games as normative multiagent 
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allowed on these servers, since it would interfere with the overall gaming 
experience. 
Normal servers are servers where no explicit rules are applied. This 
gives players a freedom from the strict rules of the RP servers which could 
possibly lead to a different kind of interaction. The special rules on the 
level of game servers are an example of the constitutive norms as 
described by Therborn. 
Factions 
All MMORPG:s have some kind of history and a world with resources 
that are being shared between its inhabitants in one way or the other.     
For the sake of making this history interesting a player belong to a faction. 
In WoW one is associated with either the Horde faction or the Alliance 
faction depending upon the race choosen during the character creation 
process. On all types of servers it would be fair to kill a character from the 
opposing faction. But there are specific norms on what is acceptable and 
what is not. For instance, a high level player who kills someone from the 
opposing faction who does not stand a chance of defending him/herself 
would be regarded as playing unfair, or even as a performing grief play, 
and may, if repeated, lead to a stressful disadvantage for the target. 
Groups (Guilds and small groups) 
Groups in WoW may lead to observable behaviour and sometimes 
conflicts. Guilds usually have a forum page where all issues concerning in 
game tactics are being discussed. Rules are usually available in the forum 
pages of guilds, to inform all players of the norms that all players should 
stick to.  
Large groups/Guilds 
Guilds are large group of players that play together often aiming at co-
operating in so called raid groups. A raid group consists of as many as 25 
players co-operating to overcome Non player characters (NPC) in special 
instances of the game. 
Small groups 
Small groups can consist of 2 or more players co-operating on small 
missions in game, called quests. In WoW, it’s sometimes apparent that the 
quests are too hard for a single player and that joining a group is the only 
solution to solve the quest.  
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  High probability of a possible sanction when the act occurs 
  By anyone (i.e., without regard to status) Only by a person or persons in a particular status or 
statuses 
evaluation of 
the act 
expectation 
concerning 
the act 
Low probability of 
a possible sanction 
when the act 
occurs 
By means that exclude 
the use of force 
By means that may 
include the use of 
force 
By means that exclude 
the use of force 
By means that may 
include the use of force 
Collective 
expectation 
Elster  
conventions 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
interaction in small 
groups and in guilds, 
cheating, and 
local norm violation 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
interaction in small 
groups and in 
guilds, cheating, and
local norm violation
Tuomela 
r-norms 
Tuomela r-norms/ 
Elster legal norms 
Collective 
evaluation  
No 
collective 
expectation  
Type B. 
Problematic 
conventions 
Grief play 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
cheating, and 
local norm violation 
Tuomela  
s-norms 
cheating, and 
local norm violation
Tuomela 
r-norms 
Tuomela r-norms/ 
Elster legal norms 
Collective 
expectation  
Type C: 
Customs 
Type F: 
empty class 
Type J: 
empty class 
Type N: 
Exogenous rules 
Guildleader using 
CTRaid Assist 
Type R: 
Exogenous laws 
No collective
evaluation  
No 
collective 
expectation  
Logical null 
class, i.e., non-
normative 
Type G: 
empty class 
Type K: 
empty class 
Elster  Elster  
quasi-moral norms quasi-moral norms 
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Table 3. Categorization of the examples gien our adapted version of Gibbs’ norm typology.
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Related research 
In Boella et al. (2008a) the EverQuest example described above is used as a running 
example in an analysis of norm negotiation in online multi-player games. The authors 
describe a two step negotiation process where the first step consists of negotiating a 
social goal and the second step is negotiating the norms and sanctions. Thus the 
setting is an argumentative one. However the norms are statements over goals rather 
than acts. Since this gives the agent freedom on how to obtain a goal there is no 
expectation concerning acts, only with regard to obtaining a goal. The authors also 
accept norms not connected to sanctions. If we put this research into Gibbs typology 
of norms then it would fit into the category “Logical null: i.e., non-normative.” Since 
we base our research on Gibbs and other social science theories on norms, the 
definition of norms (Boella et al. 2008a) use is not compliant with our definition 
because we include only norms connected to possible sanctions and as evaluations of 
acts rather than goals. A problem with goals is of course that one never knows if a 
goal will be obtained thus without the concept of time sanctioning is impossible. If 
norms instead are seen as addressing acts as they occur the evaluation is independent 
of any projections into the future. The tools proposed in (Boella et al. 2008a) address 
the issue of communication between agents at the level of goals. 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
We have introduced the reader to an extended version of the norm categorisation 
scheme developed by Gibbs (1965). In our examples we have shown that this 
framework enhances our understanding of human MMORPG gamer behaviour and 
that we can include the norms of agents external to the normative multiagent systems 
in the framework. Whatever the true explanation for the Sleeper example may be, be 
it an extreme form of collaboration or a consequence of a software glitch, it illustrates 
the point of the importance of the norms imposed from outside the agent system, 
namely the norms of the designers. If the software glitch explanation is true we may 
see this as move from the situation in L/P in Gibbs typology (i.e., only persons with a 
particular status may sanction the outcome of an action given the collective evaluation 
of the act and the collective expectation towards the act, also presuming Sony and the 
players to form one shared system) to either situations O/S (i.e., only persons with a 
particular status may sanction the outcome of an action given there is no collective 
evaluation of the act and no collective expectation towards the act, thus presuming 
Sony and the players do not form one shared system) or even to the logical null class 
(same as previous categorisation only with a low probability there will be a sanction). 
The framework itself suggests that tools for normative multiagent systems should 
include possibilities to monitor behaviour, moving the whole system to another part of 
the categorisation matrix by enabling sanctioning. We propose that the extended 
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framework needs to be developed further to a finer grained categorisation to deal with 
the (close to) real world phenomena encountered in MMORPG. 
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